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ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES IN GROUP FARMING
 
IN SOUTH KOREA*
 
by 
Edward Reed**
 
I. A TYPOLOGY OF GROUP FARMING
 
In recent years governments in many countries of the developing world,
 
socialist, have turned to some form of cooperative ag­nonsocialist as well as 

ricultural production as a means of coming to grips with the complex problems
 
of rural and agricaltural development. The various types that have been attempted
 
range from the highly collectivized asentamientos under the Frei and Allende re­
gimes in Chile to joint rice farming schemes in Taiwan. The term "group farm­
ing" has been widely used to cover this broad range of activities. A recent
 
conference defined group farming as "formal systems of organizing the group
 
conduct of farming operations," ranging from cooperative approaches to water
 1 
fully integrated communal farming systems.
distribution and machine use to 

In spite of the significant differences among activities in terms of de­
gree of integration, scale, and scope, the issues that arise in almost all of
 
these arrangements seem sufficiently similar to justify considering them as an
 
analytical category distinct fre, family farms, corporate farms, or other types
 
of farm management. These issues relate not only to the question of economic
 
rationality, but also to problems of internal organization and member commitment.
 
In Table i, I present a very generalized typology of the major types of
 
group farming in order to depict a continuum from less to more integrated and
 2
 
to standardize the use of terms--at least for the purposes 
of this paper.
 
Many examples of group farming do not fit neatly into this typology, and
 
it must be assumed that there are subcategories within each type. State farms
 
are omitted since they bear closer resemblance to corporate farms or large
 
*Paper prepared for panel on "Comparative Perspectives on the Productivity
 
of Group Farming," sponsored by the Association of Comparative Economic Issues,
 
held at Chicago, August 30, 1978.
 
**Ph.D. candidate in Development Studies, Land Tenure Center, University of
 
Wisconsin-Madison.
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Table 1. GENERAL TYPOLOGY OF GROUP FARMING 
Extent of Land & Capital Income 
Type Group Operation Ownership Accounting Examples 
1. Joint single operation private: pooled payments to Water Mgt. Assoc. 
Operations or task for single provided labor (Indonesia) 
operation a capital Joint Machine Use 
(Japan, Taiwan) 
Cooper. Work Teams 
(S. Korea) 
2. Joint 
Farming 
at least one 
farm enterprise 
private: pooled 
for enterprise 
harvest from pvt. 
holdings; payments 
Joint Rice Farming 
(East Asia) 
to provided Compact Farming 
labor & capital (Philippines) 
Ujamaa Farming 
(Tanzania) 
Pre-Co une Mutual 
Aid Teams (China) 
3. Cooperative most cooperative: pooled harvest; Cooper. Farming 
Farming enterprises usually with payments to labor Societies (India) 
reversion rights shares & dividend Type 1 Cooperative 
to land & capital (Poland) 
GAEC (France) 
4. Collective all collective: payments to Kolkhoz 
Farming enterprises usually without labor shares only (Soviet Union) 
reversion rights Hvopdong Nongjang 
(N. Korea) 
Production Team 
(China) 
Asentamiento (Chile) 
Agrarian Production 
Cooperative (Peru)' 
5. Commune all collective according to need Kibbutz (Israel) 
enterprises settlement with high level Hutterian Colony 
of collective (N. America) 
consumption 
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private farms in terms of the organizational issues involved. Special note
 
must be made of the Chinese case, with its unique commune-brigade-team struc-

It is not actually a "commune" in the sense of this typology, which as­ture. 

sumes a high degree of collectivized consumption and social life found chiefly
 
Since the present struc­i.i ideologically or religiously motivated communities. 

ture of the operational farm unit in the Chinese system--he village-based pro­
duction team--most closely resembles that of a collective, it has been classi­
fied as such.
 
The types of group farming found in the nonsocialist countries of East
 
Asia (Japan, Taiwan, South Korea) are mainly joint operations (type 1) and
 
examples of cooperative farming (type 3)
joint farming (type 2), though some 

can be found on an experimental basis in Japan.
3 Joint operations are most
 
often organized by farmers themselves in response to a changing rural economic
 
(e.g., diminishing agricultural labor supply, increasing off-farm
structure 

Joint farming has usually been introducedpart-time emplogment opportunities). 
facilitate the dissemination of "green revolution"
at government initiative to 

skills and knowledge it requires,
technology and the necessary farmer technical 

This paper will consider an example of each of these two types of group
 
farming in South Korea: (1) a farmer-initiated village-wide cooperative work
 
team tor rice transplanting (type 1); and (2) a government-sponsored joint
 
rice farming program (type 2). While the e two types cre sharply distinguished
 
from the more integrated forms of group farming in terms of scope of activities
 
the farm level the major organizational
and mode of ownership, I contend that at 

issues are quite similar.
 
II. THE KOREAN VILLhGE SETTING
 
Only about 25 percent of Korea's land area is suitable for cultivation
 
to one crop per year.
and the temperate climate limits rice, the staple food, 

Korean farmers live in villages of closely clustered houses on the lower slopes
 
on his farmland, which usually consists
of hillsides. A farmer's hou je is not 

of a number of small, scattered paddy and dry fields located at varying dis-

A strong government push is underway to consolidate and
tances from his home. 

rearrange paddy land in suitably flat regions to provide farmers with a smaller
 
number of even-sized plots.
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The natural village (maul) is the basic social and, to some extent, farm­
ing unit. The village head is usually chosen by a consensus of the village
 
"natural leaders," though he is officially appointed by the township chief.
 
There is an enduring pattern of close cooperation and interaction in all social
 
and economic activities at the maul level.
 
Underlying this pattern is a patrilineal, hierarchical kinship system
 
which may bind family subgroups of the village together in a network of ritual
 
and social obligations. Aside from formal kinship relationships, there also
 
seems to exist an informal, more egalitarian ideology which forms the basis
 
for village-wide cooperative activities found in all villages of whatever kin­
ship structure. There is a distinct loyalty to the village site (kohyang) and
 
to its inhabitants which m,.y compete with the more formally sanctioned kinship
 
4
 
loyalties.
 
As in most ither wet-rice agricultural regions of Asia, there have long
 
been informal, reciprocal patterns of cooperation among Korean farm households
 
in carryin- out farming tasks. Examples are the widespread system of labor
 
exchange (p'umasi) and cooperative water management societies (po kye). This
 
pattern of traditional cooperation springs from needs created by the trans­
planting system of rice culture and small farm scale:5 (1) the need for extra­
family labor at peak activity periods; (2) the need to share use of lumpy cap­
ital items (for plowing, lifting water, threshing, milling); and (3) the need
 
to build, maintain, and manage a common irrigation source.
 
The land reforms carried out in 1948 and 1950, while not resulting in an
 
equal distribucion of land resources in the South Korean countryside, greatly
 
reduced the rate of tenancy and, for the most part, ended the domination of
 
village affairs by large, aristo-ratic (yangban) landowners and severed village­
level patron-client relationships. However, the small size of landholdings
 
(the national average is less than 1 hectare) has persisted in spite of the
 
rapid rate of migration to urban centers.
 
The sustained high rate of economic expansion in South Korea over the
 
past fifteen years has had an uneven impact on farming communities. In the
 
early period concentration of investments in urban-based export-oriented indus­
tries led to deteriorating terms of trade for farmers, falling real incomes,
 
and a flood of outmigration from rural areas. By the early 1970s the resulting
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serious economic imbalance, as well as potential social and political unrest,
 
led to government attention to the agricultural sector. With increased rice
 
production as the keystone policy, new high-yield varieties were rapidly intro-

Under the broad banner of the
duced, supported by a purchase price subsidy. 

Saemaul (New Village) Movement, an all-encompassing rural development program
 
was pushed to improve the rural living environment and raise incomes. These
 
efforts have resulted in significantly higher rice yields, some improvements
 
in rural living conditions and income, and a discernible new enthusiasm among
 
lo-al government officials. Nevertheless, the problem of relatively low farm
 
household income persists, especially among the large number of farms holding
 
less than 1 hectare. A major difficulty has been the continued almost total
 
dependence on agriculture, chiefly rice farming, for farm household income.
 
(See Table 2 for relevant data.)
 
For the individual farmer, no matter how high his yields, the holding
 
size places a strict limit on agricultural income and also makes it impossible
 
to mechanize some operations in response to the growing labor shortage at peak
 
as an obstacle to
activity periods. National planners also view small scale 

attaining production goals through more effective extension.
 
One possible response to this problem (one which is being strongly advo­
cated by some elements within the government 6 ) is to promote consolidation of
 
farmland into larger piivate holdings by allowing a return of legal tenancy
 
and removal of the present 3-hectare ceiling on holding size (a ceiling already
 
largely ignored). An alternative response is to use group farming to enlarge
 
the scale of management and resource use without changing the scale of owner­
ship. Group farming activities have intensified recently in South Korea, both
 
at the initiative of the government through joint farming projects, and through
 
cope with small farm scale and
the spontaneous efforts of farmers themselves to 

seasonal labor shortages. This study seeks to assess the viability and poten­
tial for the group farming alternative in South Korea by an analysis of these
 
activities.
 
Material for this study comes from a case study carried out in 1977 of
 
two villages in Pyongtek County, Kyonggi Province, 
in northwestern South Korea.

Pyongtek County is made up of fifty natural villages about half of which are
 
located on a well-irrigated plain and half in an area of low hills. I will
 
7 
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STATISTICS ON SOUTH KOREAN AGRICULTURAL SECTOR,
Table 2. 

FOR BENCHMARK YEARS 
1975
1965 1970
ITEM 

377
169 261
1. Per capita GNP (1970 $) 

118 159 213
Agricultural sector 

Other sectors 
 231 347 478
 
13,244
15,812 14,422
2. Farm population (000's) 

38.2
55.1 45.9
3. Farm population as percent 

of total population (.)
 
0.90 0.93
4. Average farm size 0.94 
(in chongbo = 0.992 ha.) 
256 (118.5) 367 (170.0)
5. Average farm household income 216 (100.0) 

(000 1970 Won)
 
6. On-farm income as percent of 79.2 75.9 81.9 
farm household income (%) 
0.3888
0.2386 0.2385
7. Estimated Gini Ratio for 

rural households
 
423 (100.0) 579 (136.9) 548 (129.6)
8. Farm labor wage (1970 Won 

per day, males)
 
289 (100.0) 330 (114.2) 386 (133.6)
9. Average rice yield 

(kg. hulled rice per 0.1 ha.)
 
5.2 10.9 36.2
 10. Disease/pest control chemicals 

applied (kg. per ha.) 
Bank of Korea, Korea Statistical Yearbook; Item 6: Choo, Hakchung,
Sources: Item 1: 

"Probable Size Distribution of Income in Korea: Over Time and by Sectors,"
 
Korea Development Institute, 1977; other items: Year book of Agriculture and
 
Forestry Statistics.
 
f 
official exchange rate ($1 316 Won)." Calculated: 1970 Won 1970 
** Data for 1904 
Table 3. RELEVANT DATA ON PLAIN VILLAGE AND HILL VILLAGE,
 
PYONGTEK COUNTY, KYONGGI PROVINCE, 1977
 
Item 

1. Population 

2. Number of households 

3. Percent of households 

in largest kin group
 
4. Percent of households 

with no land or less
 
than 0.5 ha.
 
5. Percent of households 

with more than 2.0 ha.
 
6. Land area per farm 

household (ha.)
 
7. Percent of village 

paddy rearranged
 
8. Number of farm house-

holds per power tiller
 
Plain Hill Average for Villages 
Village Village in Township or Province 
348 249 249 (Case Township) 
62' 53 50 " 
13 38 
12.9 34.6 29.3 (Kyonggi Province) 
24.2 9.6 11.0 
1.63 1.40 1.18 
70 22 21 
t0 43 15 
Sources: Plain and Hill villages, survey; case township, township records;
 
Kyonggi Province, Yearbook of Agricultural and Forestry Statistics, 1977.
 
refer to the two villages as Plain village and Hill village in accordance with
 
their locations.
 
As we can see in Table 3, the two villages are quite different in several
 
ways. Plain village is larger in population, land base, and average holding,
 
and there are no large kinship networks. Hill village is an old community
 
dominated by a former yangban kinship group with an economic base significantly
 
smaller than that of Plain village.
 
III. COOPERATIVE WORK TEAM: A JOINT OPERATION
 
Organization and Rationale
 
Rice transplanting in Korea has long been done in fairly large groups.
 
There seem to be several reasons for this:
 
(1) The planting season is short and there are advantages to planting
 
each parcel quickly: (a) seedlings should be transplanted at a certain stage
 
of growth; (b) rapid transplanting means even growth of the crop in each par­
cel, allowing coordinated application of fertilizer, pesticides, and fungicides,
 
maintenance of proper water levels, and even maturation; (c) in some cases rota­
tion of irrigation water between plots may require rapid transplanting.
 
(2) Group planting allows a rudimentary division of labor.
 
(3) A lively group spirit is generated in team planting which lightens
 
the back-breaking labor and perhaps increases performance efficiency.
 
Today in the Korean countryside extra-family labor for transplanting is
 
acquired in a number of ways: (1) hiring for a daily wage landless or land poor
 
within the village or from neighboring villages, or hiring under- or unemployed
 
workers from nearby towns on an individual basis; (2) hiring a team made up of
 
village and/or nonvillage poor farmers and laborers to plant the land for a
 
flat fee based on area (togup system); (3) exchanging labor with fellow vil­
lagers (p'umasi system); (4) forming a village-wide cooperative work team (CWT)
 
to which all households contribute labor and which plants all village paddy in
 
rotation.
 
In the case township, as well as in another surveyed township in a south­
ern province, the number of villages organizing cooperative work teams for
 
transplanting has increased dramatically in the last several years. In the
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case township, almost half of the fifty villages formed teams in the spring of
 
1977. 
 The great majority reported that the system had been initiated by vil­
lagers themselves within the past one 
to five years.
 
Though government campaigns (especially the Saemaul Movement) have empha­
sized cooperation in general, the CWT is essentially a spontaneous development.
 
The decision to organize the team is almost always made at a village meeting
 
in which all households participate. The group chooses a team leader, and
 
makes decisions concerning labor accounting, water management, and order of
 
planting. The team operates as a unit for the duration of the planting season,
 
which usually lasts from three to 
four weeks, after which labor accounts are
 
settled. (The manner in which these organizational issues are handled is dis­
cussed in detail in section V.)
 
Though village work teams, called ture, existed widely in pre-land reform
 
days (and were often marked by exploitation of tenants and small holders by
 
the landlord class), most died out 
during the 1950s and 1960s as farmers turned
 
to hiring the 
large supply of cheap rural labor that accumulated with rapid
 
population growth. The recent reappearance of 
this system on a more egalitarian
 
and integrated basis can be seen as a village-wide collective response to chang­
ing economic circumstances in the context of new 
technological developments
 
which are favorable to large-scale cooperative planting.
 
Farmers give three major 
reasons for a turn to cooperative planting:
 
(1) More village labor is mobilized: Under labor exchange or hiring ar­
rangements only more skilled farm labor is 
usually employed, since farmers are
 
more careful about the value of the labor they are employing or exchanging.
 
With the CWT--since it is not a person-to-person exchange of values--all avail­
able village labor (including young and old, male and female) can be mobilized.
 
(2) Time-saving and convenience: Cooperation eliminates the need for
 
each individual farmer to make arrangements to exchange or hire labor. (Hiring
 
may entail travel to a market town to find available workers.) Instead, usu­
ally one village meeting is held to decide arrangements and a team leader works
 
out details and keeps records. 
 The farmer is free to spend time preparing his
 
fields for planting.
 
(3) Reduces cash outlays: The CWT allows the farmer to pay for labor
 
with his own labor to the fullest extent possible, thus avoiding large cash
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outlays at a time of year when he has little cash on hand. 
Also, the cash
 
that changes hands remains within the village community itself.
 
In addition, there seem to be at 
least two technical requisites for the
 
emergence of large-scale cooperative planting:
 
(1) The water supply must be dependable and flexible. Rainfed or only
 
partially irrigated fields may require large 
areas to be planted almost simul­
taneously when water is available, whereas an irrigation system which supplies
 
water continually to all fields or which permits controlling the flow of water
 
from field to field will allow group planting in rotation.
 
(2) Various rice varieties with different planting dates and maturing
 
times must be available. 
 This allows the planting season to be stretched over
 
a time period sufficient for the team to plant the whole area.
 
The Transplanting Operation
 
The transplanting operation itself involves only a few specific tasks:
 
pulling up and bunching the rice seedlings, transporting seedlings to the
 
paddy, and planting the seedlings. Except in the case of joint farms, seed­
beds are prepared separately, so that seedlings must be taken from each farm­
er's bed before planting his paddy plots. 
 The whole team works on pulling and
 
bunching seedlings and then moves to the paddy to plant them. 
Planting is
 
done in a single line stretching across one or more paddies along a marker­
string and the pace is set by the two persons moving the string down the paddy
 
from row to row. 
 Several persons are behind the line keeping a constant sup­
ply of seedlings within reach of the planters. Meanwhile, a group cf women
 
are preparing the two common meals and the 
two snacks with rice wine served
 
each day in the fields.
 
The division of labor appears fairly efficient: older members man the mov­
ing string; less skilled persons pull and supply seedlings to planters; stronger
 
men transport the seedlings; a few women prepare food for the entire team; the
 
leader is constantly engaged in assigning tasks and keeping records. 
Spirits
 
are generally very high with much banter and singing. 
As the plan.ing season
 
goes on this group euphoria seems to be a major factor in making the work
 
bearable.
 
In Plain and Hill villages farmers seemed quite satisfied that the CWT
 
served its purpose and all agreed that it would be desirable to form a CWT for
 
rice transplanting the next year.
 
IV. JOINT RICE FARMING
 
Organization and Rationale
 
a program initiated by the Korean government in the
Joint rice farming is 

late 1960s simultaneously with the introduction of new high-yield rice vari­
overcome problems inhibiting higher rice
eties.8 The major purpose was to 

yields by enlarging the scale of operation and inc,easing the degree of 
con­
trol over farmer behavior by extension agents. Under 	the program 5 to 10 hect­
10 to 15 cultivators of
 ares of rice paddy are farmed as a single unit by the 

tooperative decision-making and the majorthe included land. Ideally, there is 
operations--seedbed preparation, transplanting, water management, disease/pest 
while private ownership of thecontrol, and harvest--are carried out jointly, 
own particularland is maintaiined and each farmer receives the harvest from his 
plot.
 
Joint rice farms are organized completely at the initiative of government
 
local government officials. Each year the township office
extension agents or 

farms in its area
receives instructions to organize a specific number of joint 
and size, which are basicallyaccording to a specified organizational structure
9 
This includes a large number of "regular"the same for the whole country. 
joint farms and several "demonstration" joint farms. Because of severe per­
the demonstrationsonnel limitations, most official attention is devoted to 
farms, Host of the regular farms exist in name only, but there is a tendency 
for the lower echelon government officials to report 100 percent fulfillment
 
10
 
of assigned quotas.
 
Joint farm sites within the township are selected by township and exten-

All farmers cultivating
sion officials in consultation with village heads. 

paddy in a selected block of land are automatically joint farm members. 
 The
 
area is only a small percentage of total village paddy land and, in almost all
 
cases, the immber farmers have additional paddy outside the joint farming area
 
which they continue to farm individually.
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The authoritarian nature of the relationship between villagers and local
 
government officials makes it possible for the participation (or, at least,
 
acquiescence) of farmers to be obtained in this manner. However, actual coop­
the amount of con­erative functioning was observed to be directly related to 

tinuing supervision and pressure maintained by government agents.
 
Government extension agents give the following specific objectives for
 
the joint rice farming program: 
(1) Increase the average level of skill and technical knowledge of farmers
 
by having those with low-r yields adopt the cultivation practices of farmers
 
attaining higher yields. As demonstration plots they could serve to educate
 
nonparticipants as well.
 
(2) Reduce production costs by more efficient allocation of labor and
 
through a rational division of labor, joint input purchase and
other resources 

product marketing, and joint machine use.
 
(3) Create a network of larger farm unitt allowing easier and more rapid
 
dissemination of new techniques and new seed varieties under more closely con­
trolled conditions.
 
(4) Create an economic unit for large-scale mechanization (transplanters,
 
(At present there is significant mechani­harvesters) as it becomes feasible. 

zation only in tilling and chemical application operations.)
 
Joint Farming Operations
 
case township were located in
The two demonstration joint farms in the 

Plain and Hill villages, which had been selected by officials based on the
 
availability of suitable land blocks, location along main roads, and what they
 
Hill village joint
perceived to be a more cooperative spirit among villagers. 

farm consisted of 12 households, while the Plain village farm had 9 households,
 
and bcth were about 5 hectares in size.
 
In both cases, an organizational meeting was held in the spring with town­
ship officials and extension agents in attendance. A joint farm leader had
 
A written agreement (provided by the
been selected in advance of the meeting. 

officials) was signed by members specifying what variety was to be planted,
 
that all operations would be carried out jointly, that extension office techni­
cal instructions would be followed, and that the harvest would be marketed jointly.
 
Actual operations in the two demonstration joint farms were carried out 
as follows: 
harrowing of the paddy were done individually.(1) Plowing and 
(2) Seedbed: In Hill village demonstration farm the entire operation was
 
carried 	out collectively with a single seedbed being planted for the entire 5 
In Plain village, however, most members thought it unnecessary sincehectares. 

all were faniliar with the technique.- to be followed., and a single large bed
 
the year before had caused difficulties at transplanting time when seedlings
 
had to be transferred to distant plots. However, under strong pressure from
 
to the extent of planting their seed­township officials the farmers relented 

beds side-by-side while managing them more or less individually.
 
(3) Transplanting: In both villages joint farm members joined the vil­
lage CWT and joint farm fields were planted by the village team. This created 
a problem in Hi I villa .IL -- extensioLn agents, an effort to more closelyre 	 in 

control planting technique, insis ted that joint farm members alone plant the joint 
farr area as a team. Merrbe!rs and the village as a whole resisted this. 
Finally, the officials relented, b' e:xtension agents closely supervised thr 
transplanti.I, of the joint far.iing area. 
(4) Disease and Pest ;sontrol.: instructions for disease/pest control were 
issued by the extension office (date, amounts and technique of chemical appli­
cations). Of the several applications, some were done jointly and others 
individually.
 
(5) Harvest and Marketing: The extension agent decided when harvesting
 
was 
.- be done, but the operation was carried out individually with farmers
 
relying on traditional networks to augment family labor. Marketing is also
 
done on an individual basis (though many villagers may transport the grain
 
jointly), since almost all post-harvest marketing is done with the government
 
at established prices.
 
Farmer reception of the joint farming project has been somewhat ambivalent.
 
On the one hand, most admit its theoruti!-al advantages, but at the same time
 
they are reluctant to participate, In both case villages joint farm members
 
talked of discontinuing the project the next year unless special marketing
 
prices and 	quotas were assured for the joint farm crop. The attitude was
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clearly that the joint farm was an outside government project--not their own-­
and that they were being imposed on to participate
 
V. ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES: JOINT FARMING AND THE CWT 	COMPARED
 
When agricultural operations are carried out cooperatively a set of orga­
nizational issues arises which must be successfully dealt with if the group is
 
to attain its objectives. Even a fairly clear potential gain for the members
 
is not usually sufticient to guarantee success in organization, just as enthu­
siasm alone cannot compensate for either economic or organizational weaknesses.
 
There are clear differences in how these issues were handled in the CWT and
 
the joint farming groups. (Table 4 jummarizes these differences.)
 
Table 4. ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES IN JOINT FARM AND CWT
 
ISSUES COOPERATIVE WORK TEAM 	 JOINT FARM
 
several operations,
Scope of 	 single operation, 

single season
Activities 	 single season 

internal: village community external: gov't agency
Source of 

("institutional')
Initiative ("indigenous") 

village subgroup
Level of whole village 

Integration (40-60 households) (10-15 households)
 
social pressure
Participant social pressure 

+ institutional pressure
Mobilization 

+ economic incentives
 
Leadership 	and cooperative, hierarchical,
 
directive
Decision-Making consensus 

by labor time or area
Compensation by labor time or area 

moral incentives
moral incentives
Performance 

+ institutional pressure
Incentives 

(1) Source of Initiative:
 
The CWT was initiated by villagers themselves in response to a perceived
 
problemi which it was felt could be most effectively dealt with through cooper­
ative action. Such internally initiated activities can be termed indigenous
 
and are generally organized by natural village leaders (who may or may not
 
have official status), and they are carried out based on group consensus.
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The joint farming project, on the other hand, was carried out at the ini­
tiative of external agents, namely government extension workers and township
 
officials. The structure of the cooperating group was based on a model devel­
oped by experts in the central government and did not grow out of the village
 
community's pattern of interaction. In the case of such projects, which can
 
be called institutional, the participation and commitment of farmers must be
 
achieved by use of levers available to the external agents--rhetoric, economic
 
2
 
incentives, penalities, or whatever,1

(2) Level of Interaction:
 
Farmer cooperative activities can take place on two levels of interaction:
 
the whole village level, or a village subgroup level. The CWT represents a
 
whole village activity. Though larger villages may divide into two or more
 
planting teams (because of smaller paddy size or bookkeeping considerations),
 
in most cases nearly all village households participate.
 
Unlike the CWT, the size and composition of the joint farm is predeter­
mined. The number of members is decided by the number farming within the se­
lected 5-hectare area. The result is that those included are not necessarily 
those who work best together or who even support the idea, while Some farmers 
outside are actually jealous of the attention and suppDsed benefits accorded 
to their fellow villagers. In Hill village many farmers outside the group ex­
pressed the opinion that the joint farm created divisions within the village 
and that those who already had the advantage of fertile, well-irrigated land 
were receiving assistance, while those who really needed it were not. In addi­
tion, the joint farm group may cut across kinship or friendship lines which are 
usually followed when exchanging labor in village subgroups. 
(3) Participant Mobilization:
 
Formation of a CWT is initiated by villagers themselves, and participa­
tion for each particular household is voluntary. However, once the village
 
leaders and a majority of farmers are committed to cooperative planting, con­
siderable social pressure is brought to bear on reluctant villagers to partic­
ipate, since success depends on maximum mobilization of village labor. In
 
both villages all households provided at least some labor to the teams, though
 
several large farmers planced their land privately with hired laborers to avoid
 
late planting.
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There was a tendency (in at least two teams) for participation to drop
 
off once a farmer's land had been planted. Either the farmer preferred to pay
 
for labor received, or he had contributed enough to reciprocate for labor re­
ceived. In such cases intense pressures were applied--tie team leader and the
 
village head visited farmers and urged them to send laborers; there were also
 
sharp comments about these families among the other members. In most cases
 
these households agreed to continue participating.
 
The mobilization approach for joint farms mixes institutional and social
 
pressures with limited economic incentives. Once the area for joint farming
 
is selected, village leaders are won over to the idea by township officials.
 
The village head is in no position to decline the proposal unless he can con­
vince the officials that the project will not succeed. After a leader is
 
agreed upon between village head and the township officials, together they
 
work to convince other farmers to participate. In the case villages some were
 
less than enthusiastic but none felt he was in any position to refuse. Sev­
eral specifically stated that "there is nothing you can do once higher offi­
cials have decided on a project."
 
Some limited material incentives (aside from the possibility of higher
 
yields) are also involved. A demonstration farm usually receives its seed and
 
perhaps some chemicals free. Also a joint farm which meets yield goals receives
 
a monetary award of up to about $100 per member; though some farmers denied
 
this was a factor because individual awards for high yields are also given.
 
The strongest incentive appears to be a government guarantee that the total
 
harvest will be purchased at the set price (or even at a 10 percent premium),
 
since disposal of the high yield varieties on the open market means lower
 
prices relative to traditional varieties.
 
(4) Leadership and Decision-Making:
 
In the case of the CWT, just before the planting season an organizational
 
meeting of all villagers is held to decide whether or not to form the team, to
 
select a leader, and to decide the compensation rate and order of planting.
 
In both case villages, team leaders were proposed and agreed to by consensus.
 
The functions of the leader are to work out the order of planting through con­
sultation with the farmers, keep careful daily records of labor provided and
 
received by each household, end inform team members each day when and where to
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The leader is also important in maintaining enthusiasm,
report for planting. 

encouraging households to provide their share of labor, and resolving 
disputes.
 
team was led by the village head, buc the other
In Plain village one team
 
Like­
leader was a young person (about 30) just beginning farming on his own, 

wise, in Hill village the single team leader was a youth (23) with two years
 
The age and status of these two persons indicates that
 of college education. 

the leader does not have so much a decision-making function as one of coordi-

Several farmers indicated
nating and implementing the consensus of the group. 

own age,they would be much more reluctant to take directions from one their 
In addition, the young people have the free time and skills to devote to record­
keeping and other tasks. 
He deals with exten­farm has official status.
The leader of the int 
their directives or reconnendations
sion and government officials, passes on 

to members, and manages joint operations. In the case joint farms both lead­
seemed 
ers were !o;:it established and respected farmers. Their selection 
offi­
to depend more on a consensus between influential villagers and township 
a special training course forcials rather than team meribers. Both attended 
Center. This training, asmodel farm leaders at the Provincial R.ural Guidance 
with township and county officials gives themwell as their close association 
oris difficult to say if this enhancesaddition1l official status, but it 
complicates their leadership role. 
constant supervision by supra-village offi-A more serious problem is the 
cials. They set themselves above the farmers by dress and demeanor and convey
 
an attitude that the joint farm is their project and the farmers must conform 
Farmers show proper deference on the surface,
themselves to their purposes. 

heard to the effect that their knowledge of farm­but disparaging coments were 
ing comes from books and not experience. An important function of the leader,
 
then, becomes bridging this gap between outside supervisors and farmer-members
 
adapting the directive approach of the officials to the consensus ap­--i.e., 

proach of the villagers,,
 
(5) Compensation:
 
and the joint
There were no significant differences between the CWTs 

farms in accounting systems, since government authorities consider this an in­
ternal matter to be worked out by the joint farm members on their own.
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Actually, this issue created greater tensions within the CWT since the group
 
included landless laborers as well as farmers with a broad range of holding
 
sizes.
 
The CWT uses a type of point system for labor accounting. The group de­
cides how much a labor unit will be worth, records are kept of labor units
 
contributed and used by each household, and at the end of the season net 
labor­
using households pay into the group and net labor-contributing households re­
ceive payment from the group,
 
Plain village used a time-based point system: each hour of labor was worth
 
a certain amount. In spite of objections by some that this approach undermines
 
incentive for skilled and rapid work, it was felt by the majority that an area­
based system creates unacceptable tensions between slower planters and more
 
skillful planters. In Hill village, on the other hand, an area-based system
 
was chosen, with each unit of land (p'yong) planted worth the decided amount.
 
In both cases the value of the labor unit (per hour, or per jyn) 
was
 
decided at 
a group meeting. After a discussion of several alternatives, in
 
both villages it was decided to assign the 
same value to the labor unit for
 
all age groups and both sexes. Again, it was felt undesirable to create divi­
sions among villagers. Conflict between the interests of larger holders and
 
smaller or landless households came to the surface in deciding the value of
 
the labor unit. Here the bargaining power of the labor surplus households was
 
apparent (given the tight labor market at transplanting time) and a mutually
 
acceptable 3te was finally decided.
 
Record-keeping for the time-based approach required the leader to time
 
the planting of each field and credit the time to each worker present and debit
 
the field owner. In Hill village the team leader checked five times a day on
 
worker attendance and recorded the area planted during each of the five periods.
 
Workers would then be credited according to area planted and owners billed ac­
cording to their total land area. At the end of 
the transplanting season a
 
meeting was held to collect from net users of labor and distribute to net sup­
plier households.
 
In the joint farms accounting was done after each operation, not on a
 
yearly or seasonal basis. 
 So actually the system was an extension of the tech­
niqtes used in the CWT to other operations.
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(6) Performance Incentives:
 
there a direct link between
In neither the CW4T nor the joint farms was 

work quality and compansation. Performance quality was controlled almost en­
tirely by social pressure (i.e., "moral incentives") in the case of che CWT
 
and by social pressure plus "institutional pressure" in the form of supervi­
sion by extension agents iui the case of the joint farms.
 
In the CUT skillful planters would actually plant more than their share of 
seedlings per row--helping out the slower planters beside them--though receiv­
ing no extra compensation. Likewise in the joint farm, as long as an individ­
ual put in his time and worked hard no one complained. However. if someone 
slacked off or obviously shirked work, unkind (and not so quiet) comments by 
fellovT villagers were ucually enough to bring them into line. Team leaders 
or natural village lead&rs would speak directly to a person if the situation
 
warranted it. In general, farmers agreed that, in both groups, most worked
 
without distint.uishing between his own fields and those of others. 
In the joint farms, however, there is the added dimension of direct super­
vision by outsidei algents who often gave direct commands or criticism. In one 
case a portion of the seedbed had to be uprooted and replanted at the insis­
tence of the county-level extension office. 
VI. ASSESSMENT OF GROUP FARMING ACTIVT.TIES 
CWTs have emerged widely in rural Korea and it appears that they will per­
sist for so:me tine to come. The joint farming program has met with only very 
limited success: most joint farms remain paper groups and actual functioning 
almost always depends on continual outside attention and pressure , Explaining 
why farmers find it possible (or desirable) to cooperate in the context of one 
arrangemient and not in the other is important for assessing the potential for 
group farming in South Korea,
 
Two factors are central to successful group farming: subjective economic
 
rationality and compatibility with the social setting. Economic rationality
 
provides the incentive for overcoming the organizational difficulties of group
 
farming, while the probability that these organizational problems will be suc­
cessfully dealt with increases to the extent that the arrangement is compatible
 
with the existing pattern of social interaction and cooperation. Subjective
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economic rationality means that, for the large majority of the participants,
 
the perceived benefits outweigh a broad concept of perceived costs--i.e=, addi­
tional outlays as well as the inconvenience and personal restrictions involved
 
in joint management and joint labor.
 
The CWT successfully integrates the economic interests of net employers
 
of labor and net suppliers of labor in a way that both perceive benefits. Like­
wise, as an indigenous activity, it fits into the community pattern of organi­
zation and interaction.
 
The joint farm seems to have problems on both counts. Though there is
 
statistical and observational evidence that participants receive significant
 
economic benefits in terms of preferred access to technology, higher yields
 
and higher net income, 1 3 farmer calculation of costs and benefits apparently
 
differs in some respects. They clearly perceive greater labor inputs and cash
 
outlays, and they also count the interference of outside agents as a cost.
 
But even when farmers report receiving economic benefits, many say that it is
 
not worth the effort. This strongly indicates that the major problem is an
 
organizational one.
 
A great majority of farmers who have participated in both joint farms and
 
CWTs report that cooperation is easier in the context of the CWT even though
 
the size of the group is much larger0 Farmers do not find it easy to cooper­
ate in the joint farm because it does not fit the village pattern of coopera­
tion. A matrix using two of the organizational issues discussed earlier-­
source of initiative and level of integration--makes this clear.
 
Figure 1. Cooperative Activities by Source of Initiative
 
and Level of Integration
 
Source of Initiative
 
Internal External
 
Whole I. internal- III. external- (whole village ideology
 
Level Village whoLe village whole village potentially effective)
 
of
 
Village II. internal- IV. external- (kin group ideology
 
Integration Subgroup subgroup subgroup potentially effective)
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In Sector I (internal-whole village) of this matrix fall the CWT as well
 
In Sector II (internal-subgroup)
as village-wide mutual aid societies (kye). 

In
 
there are labor exchange, labor-capital exchange, and small group kye. 

a set of activities initiated under the
 Sector III (external-whole village) is 

Joint rice farm-
Saemaul Movement (mothers club, village bank, village store). 

ing is the only cooperative activity observed which fits into Sector IV (exter­
nal-subgroup).
 
(Sectors I and II) autom,:tically conform
Internally initiated activities 

to existing community patterns of leadership, decision-making, and conflict
 
In addition, internal-whole village activities (Sector I), includ­
ing the CWT, are usually underpinned by whole village cooperative ideology
 
(discussed earlier in the paper),14 while internal-subgroup activities (Sector
 
friendship networks, where kin affilia­
resolutioo. 

II) usually follow kin group lines or 

tions are few.
 
Externally initiated projects (Sectors III and IV) may or may not conform
 
the organizational structure
 to village organizational patterns, depending on 

inflexibly the structure
of the introduced institution and on how flexibly or 

The village bank program, for example, has been fairly successful
is imposed. 

because, in most cases, villages have been left free to organize it along the
 
same way, accounting in the joint
same lines as existing village kye. In the 
not a serious problem because it is left tip to the participants tofarms is 

farm leader and the direct involve­work out. However, the role of the joint 
ment of external agents in day-to-day operations are elements of the joint farm 
create problems.

which seriously conflict with existing patterns and so 

(Sector III), even though not initiated
External-whole village activities 

by villagers, can benefit from the whole-village cooperative ideology simply
 
because they involve all village households. As in the case of some Saemaul
 
projects, cooperation in this situation may actually be for the purpose of
 
seen as an unwelcome burden. External-subgroup activities
distributing what is 

(Sector IV), however, can only benefit from kin or friendship networks if the
 
the group is decided by the villagers themselves. In the case
composition of 

of the joint farms we have seen that membership is arbitrarily determined by
 
paddy location and it is highly unlikely that the group will be composed of
 
farmers who normally cooperate in subgroups.
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External-subgroup activities, then, are the most unlikely to fit into the
 
existing social context, In the case of the joint farm, one interpretation is
 
that the incompatibility of the organizational structure with the social set­
ting raises the cost of cooperation for members above the level of real per­
ceived benefits, making the undertaking subjectively unrewarding.
 
VII. THE POTENTIAL FOR GROUP FARMING IN SOUTH KOREA
 
We come to the basic question: what is the potential contribution of group
 
farming to future South Korean agricultural development and in what form might
 
it have the best chance of success? The results of this 5tudy indicate that
 
(1) group farming can play an important role in South Korea in smoothing farmer
 
adjustment to a changing economic structure while maintaining fairly equal ac­
cess to opportunities, and (2) a strong and resilient organizational structure
 
exists for group farming in many village communities.
 
In the immediate future at least three bases for group farming seem to
 
exist in South Korea:
 
(1) The fact that CWTs have spontaneously emerged is an indication that a
 
strong basis for cooperative action exists in labor pooling for peak season op­
erations, such as transplanting and harvesting.
 
(2) There is also evidence that grouping of farmers for the introduction
 
of new technology can assure a more even distribution of benefits as well as
 
more rapid dissemination. This is especially true for the seedbed and disease­
pest control operations, which are the keystones of the high-yield program. A
 
cooperative approach can also assure safe and proper application of chemicals,
 
as environmental pollution is becoming a critical problem in rural Korea.
 
(3) In the near future, a further step in mechanization is likely to take
 
place if the rural labor force continues to decline and powered transplanters
 
and harvesters are made available. There are several reasons why group acqui­
sition and use of these machines may be perferable. One reason is that the
 
unit cost makes the machine an uneconomic investment for all but the very
 
largest farmers; and, unlike in Japan, off-farm Dpportunities are not suffi­
cient to compensate for high cost. Equally important is the fact that prema­
ture introduction of transplanters or harvesters will threaten an important
 
income source for the large number of landless and small farmers. When a group
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composed of all farm-size households controls decision-making concerning mech­
anization it is more likely that the process will be gradual and in accorda-ice
 
with the actual availability of agricultural labor.
 
the bases for group farming in South Korea
 As this discussion implies, 

case
single operations. This is the 
are best considered from the viewpoint of 

since we must assume a continuing comitment to private ownership 
of farmland
 
a higher stage of cooperative integration. Another
 and a reluctance to move to 

factor is that Korean farmers themselves tend to approach the issues 
on an
 
It is this approach which best fits the tradi­operation-by-operation basis. 

also flexible enough

tional patterns of reciprocity and accounting, and it is 

rapidly changing rural conditions, The Organizational unit for to adjuSt to 
coordinating and integrating these various group operations is obviously 
the
 
At this level the basis and ex-perience sts for maul, or natural village. 
with the authorities. group decision-making, labor accounting, and interaction 
maul more and more be-The model that emerges, then, is one in wnic h the 
unit in terms of acquisition of inputs, t.oordination of labor comes the fari-.ing 
and 
and capita. resources, dissemnination of new tecinology and informa :ion, 
soouife cases (such as transplantingincome activities. Inpromotion o :idoline a vii Lago-wide
and chenica- app-ication) labor and capital wi 11 he pool ud on 
for other operations (e.g., seedbcd preparation, winter cropping)basi,;, whi ic 
The maul unit itself will serve assubgroups o- interested farmers may form. 
these activities and governmental extension and the official linkage between 
National Agricultural Cooperative 
units, 14
 
this model is to
 There are at least three requisites to be fulfilled if 

have any functional relevance:
 
(1) There must be important changes in the administration of rural and
 
The highly centralized formulation and administra­agricultuial development. 

to a glaring gap between perception of problems and
 tion of programs has led 

one hand, and the reality at
the center on the
assessment of program impact at 

officials to ful-
Pressure is placed on local
the village level on the other. 

fill technical as well as organizational quotas (e.g.. number of joint farms
 
to both coercive action
 or mothers clubs organized), which inevitably leads 

against villagers and exaggerated reports of success. Ariladministrative ap­
proach that would encourage and build on village networks and initiative demands
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a significant degree of autonomy and flexibility at the local level, and
 
respect for the fact that new institutions take time to become established.
 
(2) Closely related is the need for official encouragement for group ac­
tivitiev through economic incentives and legalized status. Though Korean gov­
ernment authorities have the power to require at least pro forma participation
 
in programs by farmers, the long-term results of this approach are doubtful.
 
Steps could be taken to strengthen the official status of the maul and to use
 
specific economic incentives to promote its integration as a farming unit.
 
(3) Finally, there is the important issue of internal village socioeconomic
 
structure. Survey results from forty Korean villages indicate a strong relation­
ship between successful cooperation and equality of land distribution in the
 
village. Kinship structure is also important, but apparently much less so.
 
Because of the impact of the land reforms and the Korean War, until recently
 
most Korean villages could be characterized as relatively classless communities.
 
However, as so-called progressive farmers with large holdings emerge i:u some
 
areas, tfere is a tendency for a new capitalist class system of large holders
 
and farm laborers to develop. Cooperation in such communities becomes almost
 
impossible.
 
Therefore, so long as a large population remains in agriculture and off­
farm opportunities are limited, in any particular village cooperation and pri­
vate large-scale land consolidation can only be viewed as alternative solutions
 
to the problem of small scale. If policy-makers seek to influence institu­
tional adjustment in the direction of cooperative units, consolidation into
 
large private farms which leads to sharp polarization of asset ownership should
 
be discouraged. Of course, farm size will increase gradually as more families
 
move out of farming. If a cooperatively functioning maul unit is given some
 
jurisdiction over land use and transactions, it may be possible to make a
 
transition to larger scale in a way that all villagers benefit.
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NOTES 
1. Conference on "Experience and tential for Group Farming in Asia," 
sponsored by the Agricultural Development Council, Singapore, August 1977. 
See A/D/C Newsletter, no. 37, October 1977, p. 8. 
2. B. Galeski (5) proposes a typology based on tho objectives of the 
organizing group and also constructs a continuum of group farming types 
based on degree of socialization. 
3. See N. Kanazawa (7), and Yang and Iuang (15). 
4. Concerning the Korean kinship system, see M.G. Lee (11); on the kohyang 
concept, see V. Brandt (3). 
5. See L..Hanks (6), J. Wong (14), and B. Pasternak (12). 
6. See for e::ample, S.H. Kim (9); also governmeut policy thinking iq reflected 
in newspaper reports: "Land Holding Coiling to be Abolished," Dong-A Ilbo (Seoul), 
Septembcr 12, 1977, p. 1; "South Korean Farmers--Ptroductive but Vanishing 
Breed," N o.; ionok Times, .un, 10, 1978. 
7. The cas- . dv was followed by a surev of 40 villages and over 200 
household; inf to.nships. Prelim;inary analvnis of the survey results indicate 
that the epTriencc of the cse study -ill ages i fairly generalizable. 
8, Apparw:lv the s;stem ;i..basd on earlier Japanese ioint farmin, programs. 
farms ' introduced on a trial basis in 1968 and then later implementedJoint 

on a nati ' i asis. S. o( (4).
 
Th' folo'in'g table gives official data on regular and demonstration 
joint rica farms: 
jumaber of Joint Farms, Area, and Number of Member Ilouseholds, b Year 
1970 1974 1976Item 1968 1972 
Number of Joint 500 22,896 22,045 28,293 51,396
 
Rice Farms
 
2.6 300 187 393 528
Area (000's ha.) 

(Percent of total (0.2) (23.6) (14.9) (31.0) (40.9)
 
paddy)
 
Number of Member 
households (000's) 8.7 817 625 1,197 1,424
 
(Percent of Total) (0.3) (32.9) (25.5) (50.3) (61.0)
 
Source: Office of Rural Development
 
In 1977, there were at least 2,924 demonstration joint farms in the
 
country (two in each township). Assuming an average of 12 members on 5
 
hectares of paddy, there were 35,088 member households (1.57 of total house­
holds) and 14,620 hectares (1.1% of total paddy area).
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9. South Korean governmental and administrative institutions are characterized
 
by extreme centralization with authority and program iuitiative emenating from
 
the -enter and flowing downward to the townshi*.p level. Officials at every
 
level are appointed; a brief experiment with a local clective system was
 
suspended in 1961. See R. Aqua (1), pp. 3-7.
 
10. 	 Of 83 regular joint farms officially organized in the case township in
 
1976, only 10 reported carrying out any joint activities. In 1977, of 70
 
regular joint farms reportedly established none could be found that carried
 
out joint operations.
 
11. 	 The major organizational issues involved in group farming are discussed 
in an earlier paper: E. Reed (13). 
i2. This concept and terminology are borrowed from J.W. Bennett (2).
 
13. See J.H. Lee (10), H.K. Kim (8,',and M.S. Cho (4).
 
14. It is theorized that this ideology is stronger in somae villages than
 
in others (Bennett). Survey data from this study indicates that successful
 
cooperative activity is related to the distribution of land and, to a lesser
 
extent, to the village kinship structure.
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